By Molly Fallek, Class of 2019

The Cold War dominated international affairs from the end of World War II until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. For more than forty years, the struggle between East and West, communism and democracy, the United States and the Soviet Union, colored the lives of people around the world. The lengthy Cold War -- and the occasional proxy hot wars it entailed -- can be traced to American policies established during the Truman Administration, most notably the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan constituted the first, unofficial battle of the Cold War and its adoption ensured that the world would be divided into increasingly separate spheres. The plan became the centerpiece of American foreign policy during the Cold War era; it helped America gain strategic allies, promote capitalism and, at all costs, impede Communist expansion.  The Marshall Plan, an articulated, long-term strategy borne of the policy of Containment, aimed to bolster the economies within the United States’ area of influence and deter communist expansion thus dividing the world into separate, competitive blocs.

The physical and economic destruction caused by World War II created an unprecedented level of instability that left Europe politically vulnerable. The European nations that had participated, many of which were crucial to the balance of power in Europe prior to the war, saw their infrastructure, economic institutions, and militaries devastated. Germany, including the once vibrant city of Berlin, was in ruins: only around 25 percent of its buildings remained standing after the War. Conditions were not much better in France, Italy, or other countries on the continent. Italy, for instance, could not produce enough food to feed its citizens. Even England, which had previously dominated the international markets and was the pre-war political superpower, was reduced to a second-tier power. The pre-existing political and economic hierarchy in Europe was destroyed, leaving a void that the United States and the Soviet Union would compete to fill.

Unlike its European counterparts, many of which were mired in economic turmoil and political uncertainty, the United States experienced a wave of post-war prosperity that allowed it to assume a leadership position in the international landscape. The United States emerged from World War II relatively unscathed and, in fact, thrived politically and economically. From the beginning of the war in 1939 to its conclusion in 1945, the United States’ gross national product doubled due to destruction of European markets. Europe’s economic issues allowed the United States to become the dominant global manufacturer, producing about half of the merchandise for the world. To put America’s rise into perspective, across the seas, two out of every three ships were manufactured in the United States. The exceptional economic success enjoyed by the United States put it in the unique position of being able to influence political relations in Europe. As a newly minted superpower the United States possessed the economic leverage and political stability to forge a new European system based on its own philosophies and ideologies. This newfound economic and political strength also pitted the United States against another rising power to the East.

The Soviet Union, although not nearly as financially stable as the United States, also sought to establish a global leadership position which would empower it to spread its Soviet-style Communism throughout Europe. The power vacuum that was left in Europe after the destruction of Nazi Germany, provided the Soviet Union with the opportunity to extend its influence.  However, its geopolitical ambitions placed the Soviet Union in direct competition with its former wartime ally, the United States. At the Yalta conference in 1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin gathered to discuss the reconstruction of Europe. Stalin promised that there would be free elections in states under the Soviet sphere of influence. The United States and Britain were cautiously optimistic that democracy was a possibility in the East, but this hope turned out to be unrealistic. In reality, Stalin was acutely aware of the Soviet Union’s connection to the Slavic populations in Eastern Europe and used this cultural and philosophical affinity to inculcate Soviet ideals in the region. The Soviet Union began to meddle in Eastern European elections, using its military as a means of enforcing a Communist agenda. Throughout Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union would install puppet regimes whose political and economic policies were in line with those of the Soviet Union. Although the United States may have perceived that the Soviet Union was acting out of aggression and antagonism, its actions were motivated by historical concerns. Throughout the centuries, the Soviet Union had been invaded by foreign aggressors with malicious intent. The Soviet Union’s expansion of its sphere of influence into Eastern Europe, served to create “a buffer zone” to protect the country.

As the United States government struggled to compose a unified foreign policy strategy to address Soviet expansion; the Soviets took advantage of western indecision. In 1946, the Republicans won control of Congress after campaigning on a revamped version of Warren G. Harding's “return to normalcy.” The Republicans petitioned to demobilize the army, return jobs to America and lower taxes. The Democrats accused Republicans of isolationism because of their resistance to the “crusade against Communism.” The isolationist movement and its popularity among war-weary Americans impeded the Democrats’ ability to pursue more aggressive measures against the Soviets. The deadlock between Democrats and Republicans over the United State’s approach to Communism enabled the spread of Soviet influence into Eastern Europe and ultimately left Western power at a disadvantage. Democratic policymakers searched for a compelling rationale that would convince the American public and Congress that international communism was growing threat.

The communist-led coup in Greece, which was viewed as an indirect extension of the Soviet Union’s influence in Europe, convinced the American government that the Soviet Union posed an imminent danger to European stability. In 1946, the British shocked the United States by announcing that Britain did not have the means to support Greece. Due to Greece's strategic location in the Eastern Mediterranean and mounting pressure from the Soviet Union, the United States and specifically the State Department grew wary that Greece would gravitate towards the Soviet Union’s bloc. Greece’s tenuous position led American leaders to theorize that if Greece fell to Communism, other countries in the Mediterranean, such as Turkey, would follow the Soviet’s lead, creating a “domino” effect in the region. George Kennan, one of the most influential American foreign policy leaders of this time and a proponent of Containment, reminded Americans “that … as things stand today, it is not Russian military power, which is threatening us, it is Russian political power … If it is not entirely [a] military threat, I doubt it can be effectively met entirely by military means” (George Kennan in Gaddis, 40). Initial articulation of military containment was based around the idea that all nations would opt for a democratic system if given the chance. But the coup in Greece led policymakers to question this assumption. Greece was “threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand men, led by communists, who def[ied] the Government's authority…” (Harry S. Truman, Truman Doctrine). Truman realized that the issue was not only Russian influence, but also “homegrown” communists at the forefront of the Greek rebellion. From the American perspective, however, Soviet and Greek communism were one and the same. The coup in Greece was “led by communists” and that was all that mattered. In the aftermath, American sentiment dramatically shifted away from isolationism.  Policymakers recognized the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence was increasing, and finally called for a new policy.

As the threat of communism loomed, the Truman Administration called for the proactive containment of the Soviet Union. The policy of Containment marked the United States’ attempts to indirectly and directly interfere with Soviet expansion, described by George Kennan as a “policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show[ed] signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world” (George Kennan in Paterson, 72). The new policy directed the United States would support democracies across Europe and forge potential new allies and economic trading partners. Indirectly, the United States (through the Central Intelligence Agency) meddled in European “free” elections, encouraged governments to commit to the American bloc and accused, perhaps unfairly, the Soviet Union of foul play. The policy of Containment was, in some respects, a new form of imperialism, where the dominant nations attempted to influence regions and create puppet governments to promote their own interests. But despite this policy, communism continued to expand.

When Czechoslovakia fell to communism in 1948, American strategists realized that their policy was not strong enough; it took more than just a policy to contain communism: it took a plan. George Marshall, revered American general, Secretary of State and advocate of containment, announced during a speech at Harvard University the outlines of what would become the Marshall Plan. Marshall explained that “Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist” (George Marshall, Harvard address). The plan was not designed to override the Truman Doctrine but rather to articulate a more concrete long-term strategy. At its core, the Marshall Plan, officially known as the European Recovery Program, was a vast system of economic support for any European country that agreed to adopt capitalism and western-style democracy. Indeed, the United States gave billions of dollars to ensure that the plan was thoroughly implemented to achieve its final goal: keeping communism out of Western Europe.

In addition to the overt benefits that the Marshall Plan extended to Europe, it also created the conditions under which the United States could reinforce its global economic dominance. The Marshall Plan, in the eyes of concerned congressional leaders, was “the biggest damn interference in international affairs that there has ever been in history. We are responsible for the people who stay in power as a result of our efforts” (Henry C. Lodge in Paterson, 45). The economic stipulations of the plan gave the United States partial or complete control over previously sovereign nations. Countries were essentially placing their economic fates in the hands of the United States and with them their independence. The United States was gravely concerned about the repercussions a destroyed European economy would have on the status of the American economy. The old and new world-economic relationships became interwoven: the United States relied on Europe to buy its products, and Europe relied on money from the United States to pay for them. The Marshall Plan built alliances from which Western European nations could not afford to withdraw.

Through the Marshall Plan, the United States sought to create a community of nations whose political and social ideologies directly ran counter to those of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. The United States imposed clear criteria for nations that wished to be a part of the Marshall Plan, which was crafted for “friends of the United States.” “Friends” implied that if countries wanted economic support, they would have to dissociate from the Soviet Union and adopt democratic systems aligned with the United States’ policies. At the time the Marshall Plan was created, one of President Truman’s advisors Clark Clifford spoke of their goals: “it is our hope that [the Soviet Union] will change their minds and work out with us a fair and equitable settlement when they realize that we are too strong to be beaten and too determined to be frightened” (Clark Clifford in Gaddis, 22). Although, the United States said the plan would promote positive relations with the Soviet Union, it had the opposite effect. Countries needed to reject any relations with the Soviet Union to be included in the Marshall plan. Unlike ordinary foreign policy documents that aim to reduce tensions between nations, the Marshall Plan actually isolated the Soviet Union and dramatically polarized international relations.

The Soviet Union viewed the Marshall Plan as a fundamentally corrupt strategy that sought to “enslave Europe” in a web of capitalist obligations. The Soviet assumption that the Marshall Plan was corrupt was not utterly farfetched. Initially, the Soviet Union was disingenuously invited to participate in the Marshall. In fact, it was Dean Acheson, an influential Cold War expert, Undersecretary of State, and member of the Truman Administration, who explained, “we should not ask [the European members of the Marshall Plan] what they want; we should tell them what they need” (Dean Acheson in Paterson, 45). Through the Marshall Plan, the United States had the power to reshape Europe, and statements like Acheson’s, only made the Soviets more fearful.

The Soviet Union’s wariness of and antipathy toward the United States did not originate in the political tensions of the post-war environment. Beginning with the Russian Revolution, the Soviets had ample experience with international aggressors and, in particular, American hostility. They had reason to believe that the Marshall plan was an “American design to enslave Europe,” in pursuit of American interests. Although lacking a mutual agreement on how to handle the post-war reconstruction, the lines between the Soviet Union and the United States were bound to be sharply drawn, as each country stood determined to expand its sphere of influence. The Soviets’ notion that the Marshall Plan was a hostile act of imperial power was not, however, what European beneficiaries came to believe. The plan was an overwhelming success among Western European nations. In an effort to combat this popularity, or at least offer an alternative, the Soviets created their own “Molotov Plan,” a Soviet version of the Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe. The Molotov Plan effectively created a political and economic wall between East and West. This barricade encompassed all nations in the Soviet sphere of influence, setting up the metaphorical battlefields of the Cold War. Following this decision, diplomacy between the two nations came to a virtual standstill. Conditions between the two nations were practically unalterable because of the philosophical disagreement and the lack of communication. Instead, the two superpowers petitioned for international support more aggressively than ever, meddled in elections, sought alliances and at every opportunity indirectly fought each other. The Cold War had begun. As historian Thomas Paterson notes in his book On Every Front “The transition from full-scale war to postwar peace, hardened into a four-decade-long Cold War.”

The Cold War defied every convention starting with its opening battle of words rather than ammunition.  Its style was unorthodox as it was a primarily an economic war, not a military war between the two combatants. From the start it was the Marshall Plan that defined this style of war. In the immediate post war environment American foreign policy makers assumed that by vocalizing their strategies, they were fighting communism. In reality, tough talk sounded good but failed to achieve anything of substance in this new type of war. The only way to reduce European and American fears were to write and ultimately institute a plan. The Marshall Plan sought to make the United States and its brand of capitalism dominant across Europe and eventually the world. One of the primary reasons the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 was that its leaders finally realized communism did not have the economic capacity to compete with  capitalism. When the Soviet Union fell, due to the recognition that communism would never triumph over capitalism, it validated the ideology of the policy of Containment and the Marshall Plan. It just took fifty years to get there.

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